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Abstract 
While the presence of foreign fighters in military conflict has been a regular ingredient of jihad, never 
before in modern history have foreign fighters gathered at the scale and speed as they have in the 
territory of the so-called Islamic State. As the foreign fighter phenomenon in Syria and Iraq poses 
severe security risks for the sender countries, especially from battlefield returnees and lone-wolf 
sympathizers, it becomes imperative to better understand the push factors of expat jihadism. Empirical 
studies of these factors are still scarce and often generate contradicting results. The objective of our 
paper is to contribute to the emerging discussion of the push factors of expat jihadism and to 
complement the findings of the few empirical studies already conducted. Contrary to other studies, we 
provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that Muslim youth unemployment is a driver of expat 
jihadism not only for the Arab world, but globally.  
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The presence of foreign fighters in military conflict has been a regular ingredient of jihad (Dragon, 
2015). In the 1980s, foreigners flocked to Afghanistan to fight alongside the mujahedeen during the 
Soviet-Afghan war. The same, albeit to a lesser extent, could be observed in Bosnia and Chechnya in 
the 1990s and again following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Nevertheless, the Syrian civil war and the 
rise of the so-called Islamic State (IS) have broken new ground. Never before in modern history have 
foreign fighters gathered at the scale and speed as they have in the territory of the IS (Hegghammer, 
Syria’s Foreign Fighters, 2013; Lang & Al Wari, 2016). 
 
Since the outbreak of the 2010 Arab uprising and the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, tens 
of thousands of fighters from a multitude of countries have joined the IS and other extremist groups in 
Syria. The majority of foreign fighters come from Arab states, mainly Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan 
and Morocco.  However, a significant number of foreign fighters also come from Western countries, 
including Belgium, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, along with former Soviet Union states 
such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan (The Soufan Group, 2015).  
 
The foreign fighter phenomenon in Syria and Iraq involves severe security risks to the sender countries. 
Expat jihadists who have supported military, paramilitary, and terrorist operations on the ground may 
continue their fight as returnees against targets in their homeland. In 2016, it has been estimated that 
almost 30 percent of European Union citizens who joined the fight in Syria have returned home 
(International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016). Thomas Hegghammer, Director of Terrorism 
Research at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment in Oslo and cited in (Gardner, 2013), 
suggests that “Syria will prolong the problem of jihadi terrorism in Europe by 20 years” and that attacks 
by foreign fighter returnees are “almost inevitable.”  
 
With this security risk in mind, it becomes imperative to better understand the factors behind the flow 
of foreign fighters into Syria. So far, the literature has produced mixed results regarding the push 
factors of expat jihadism. Some studies argue that they have their origin in economic grievance, others 
deny such a relationship. Empirical studies are generally still scarce. The objective of our paper is 
therefore to contribute to the emerging discussion of the push factors of expat jihadism and to 
complement the findings of the few empirical studies already conducted.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the relevant literature. We 
present our data and methodology in section three. A discussion of our empirical findings follows in 
section four. We conclude with a summary of our main results and outlook in section five. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Following the recent emergence of IS, there has been a growing body of literature examining the 
foreign fighters’ phenomenon and the determinants of Islamic radicalization in the west. Some studies 




but highly variable, coincidental, and even random. Lorenzo Vidino, a visiting fellow at the RAND 
Corporation and cited in (Helfont, 2011) argues that “the whole experience of foreign fighters is often 
shaped by coincidences largely beyond the control of the ‘wannabe’ foreign fighter.” Such 
coincidences may be social, cultural, and economic events that foreign fighters were exposed to prior 
to leaving their home. Likewise, Cilluffo et al. (2010) state that, “there is no single pathway to 
becoming a foreign fighter, nor is there a static profile of the fighters themselves. Ideology, social 
circumstances, adventure seeking, political grievances, and so on, all appear to impact individuals’ 
choices in this regard. Foreign fighters’ socioeconomic circumstances also appear to be highly 
variable” (2010, p. 36). 
 
Nevertheless, research on foreign fighters is usually distinguishing between pull and push factors 
behind such phenomenon (Daniels, et al., 2015). According to Schmid and Tinnes (2015, p. 38), pull 
factors include existence of extremist ideology that provides significant justifications for attacks 
against outgroup members (e.g. non-Muslims), existence of like-minded militant peer-group that 
strengthens individual inclination to become foreign fighter, and personal recognition: prospect of 
recognition as valiant fighter for a holy cause and opportunity to boost one’s (self-)image from near 
“zero [in own country] to hero” [in the land of jihad], among others. As for the push factors, they 
include estrangement from mainstream society by uprooted migrants in refugee camps and diasporas, 
socio-economic marginalization and aggravation, relative deprivation and/or political exclusion, as 
well as lack of future perspectives at home and desire to escape, among others (Schmid & Tinnes, 
2015, p. 38). 
 
Several recent studies investigate the aforementioned pull factors. Skidmore (2014) proposes that 
identifying with the conflict serves as a magnet for foreign fighters into Syria. This conflict identity 
could be the sectarian nature of the Sunni-Shiite conflict, the persisting effect of previous conflicts in 
nearby countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, and failing U.S. policies toward the ongoing conflict.  
 
Duyvesteyn and Peeters (2015) use comparative case studies to investigate why the conflict in Syria 
attract more foreigners willing to fight without substantial pay and without any apparent link to the 
conflict other than religious affinity with the Muslim side. The authors claim that the diverging levels 
of Muslim foreign fighter recruitment in the most recent conflicts, including the one in Syria, can 
largely be explained by three factors: access to the battlefront, internal cohesion or group unity, and 
chances of success. They argue that all three factors are relevant to explain the record number of foreign 
fighters in Syria, as access to the Syrian battlefront was significantly easy. Once present on the ground, 
the chances of success were high as the IS was actively realizing the reestablishment of the Caliphate 
(2015, p. 26). Interestingly, the authors also note that in reality rebel and opposition groups lack internal 
cohesion. Nevertheless, IS propaganda has been relatively successful in luring people into jihad with 
brotherly war romanticism. 
 
Other studies focus on the push factors behind recruitment to militant Islamist groups - what Thomas 




of correlations, Verwimp (2015) shows for a sample of European countries that a positive correlation 
exists between the gap in employment and education between first and second generation migrants and 
non-migrants on the one hand and the number of Syria fighters per million inhabitants on the other 
hand.  
 
Examining factors associated with Islamist violence in OECD countries as well as in Syria, Thomas 
(2015) finds that OECD countries appear to experience Islamist violence as a result of large numbers 
of economically and socially segregated immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa. These 
immigrants do not benefit from the relatively high living standards, or levels of equality in their host 
countries. Consequently, more of them radicalize and participate in Islamist violence, either in Syria 
or in their new home. Moreover, the author shows that, for all non-OECD countries, stronger civil 
liberties appear to decrease both Islamist domestic violence and the outflow of foreign fighters to Syria. 
This finding coincides with those of Krueger (2006, p. 3), who reports that countries with low levels 
of civil liberties or political rights are likely to have more of their citizens join the Iraqi insurgency.  
 
Recently, Benmelech and Klor (2016) find that poor aggregate economic conditions are not a major 
determinant of expat jihadism. The authors conclude that “in contrast to conjectures made recently by 
economists and policy makers, economic conditions are not the root causes of the global phenomenon 
of ISIS foreign fighters. In fact, many foreign fighters originate from countries with high levels of 
economic development, low income inequality, and highly developed political institutions” (p. 11). 
The authors also take special issue with the fact that so many foreign fighters come from Western 
European countries, arguing that if “poverty and lack of social equality are not to blame, then why are 
Western European countries disproportionately significant sources of ISIS foreign fighters? The reason 
lies in other country characteristics: they are ethnically and linguistically homogenous. In fact, the 
more homogenous the host country is, the greater difficulty immigrants such as Muslims from the 
Middle East experience in assimilating. As other research has shown, isolation induces some of them 
to become radicalized” (p. 11). 
 
Moreover, Benmelech and Klor (2016) find that, in the case of non-Muslim-majority countries, 
unemployment is not a significant determinant of the likelihood of joining ISIS. The authors argue that 
“income inequality, unemployment, and social and political conditions are not determinants of joining 
ISIS in non-Muslim countries” (p. 9). Such finding correlates with other studies that find no 
relationship between both unemployment and terrorism (Berman, Callen, Felter, & Shapiro, 2011; 
Feldmann & Perala, 2004; Piazza, 2006).  
 
Nevertheless, considerable empirical literature finds unemployment to be positively associated with 
terrorist events (Flowers, 2014; Goldstein, 2006; Piazza, 2006). The presence of male youths is often 
considered as a “conflict risk” that makes the instigation and perpetuation of violence more likely. The 
authors of the 2003 World Youth Report state that, “The dearth of opportunities in their communities 




371). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) postulate that the presence of uneducated and unemployed, mostly 
male, youths presents a significant variable that heightens conflict risk. Honaker (2011) shows that 
unemployment is a leading factor to explain violence in Northern Ireland. Sayre (2009) finds a positive 
relationship between unemployment and Palestinian suicide bombings in West Bank. Examining 
terrorist attacks from 1980-2008 across 56 countries, Richardson (2011) links high unemployment 
rates and poverty with terrorism. Caruso and Schneider (2011, p. 544) finds that an increase of 1% in 
youth unemployment translates into a .5% increase in terrorist activity.  
 
The association between youth unemployment and terrorism falls within the hypothesized argument 
of eruption of political violence in the presence of “youth bulge” (Urdal, 2006). Lia (2003) defines 
“youth bulge” as a phenomenon, where the population under the age of 30 surpasses a ratio of 1.27 in 
comparison with the population over the age of 30 in a certain society. According to Urdal (2006), 
“youth bulges” pose significant challenges to governments, increasing amounts of terrorist activity in 
the face of economic downturns and rising education levels. The potential for violent crimes and 
terrorism begins to escalate as population growth exceeds economic growth. Cincotta (2005) argues 
that countries with a percentage of 40 percent or more young people of the population, combined with 
other factors, cross a “danger threshold” that makes it 2.5 times more probable that these societies will 
fall into violence.  
 
Currently, the Arab world is suffering from a considerable youth bulge, as youth between the ages of 
15 and 29 comprise more than 30 percent of the population of the Arab world - roughly 300 million 
people. This is the highest proportion of youth to adults in the region’s history (Dhillon, 2008; Moran, 
2016). According to Dudley (2016), the World Bank estimates that unemployment is running at 11.5% 
around the Arab region, far higher than the global unemployment rate (5.9%) and most low and middle 
income countries (5.7%). Moreover, labor force participation rates are significantly lower than 
elsewhere in the world, at 53% overall and just 25% among women.  
 
According to the latest Arab Youth Survey, conducted on 3,500 people between the age 18-24 in 16 
Arab countries, lack of jobs is perceived by Arab youth as the biggest factor driving people into the 
arms of IS (ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, 2016). More specifically 24% of respondents pointed to 
unemployment as the main recruiter for the jihadi movement. Other factors they pointed to include the 
belief by those joining ISIS that their interpretation of Islam was superior to others (18%) and regional 
tensions between Sunni and Shia groups (17%) (ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, 2016). 
 
Our paper is methodologically closest to Benmelech and Klor (2016), but we challenge their finding 
to rule out unemployment as a factor of expat jihadism. While the authors obtain in their empirical 
results some positive correlation between unemployment and the number of foreign fighters, they state 
that “ISIS foreign fighters per Muslim residents is (…) not highly correlated with unemployment” (p. 
7), and that the “positive correlation between unemployment and ISIS foreign fighters (…) is driven 




In this paper we argue that youth unemployment, instead of general unemployment, is a determinant 
of expat jihadism. Moreover, we also consider the interaction between youth unemployment with the 
Muslim population share as another meaningful proxy for variables affecting expat jihadism, such as 
conflict identity, alienation, and lack of assimilation. This variable is also very robust in alternative 
specifications. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework, Data and Methodology 
What push factors drive foreign fighters into Syria? A theoretical framework for such a decision may 
be found in a simple time allocation model. Assume that a representative expat jihadist has the standard 
Cobb-Douglas utility function  
  1,U C J C J     (1) 
where 
C = consumption good and  
J = time spent on jihadist activity and 
 and (1- ) = the utility elasticities of C and J, respectively. 
We think of the time spent on jihadist activities as a spectrum that ranges from, for example, reading 
about jihadist ideology on the internet to actually preparing for jihadism. The first requires very little 
time allocation, the latter a lot. The more time a jihadist chooses to allocate towards jihadist activity, 
the more likely this activity is concerned with preparations to become a foreign fighter.  
In our simple model, the consumption function depends on exogenously determined available 
employment opportunities, E, and the time spent on jihadist activity, J. The amount of available 
employment opportunities has two effects on the jihadist’s consumption possibility frontier. More 
employment opportunities increase both consumption opportunities and the opportunity cost of time 







   (2) 
We assume that employment opportunities can be expressed on a scale between 0<E<1. This implies 
that as E approaches zero, the time available for jihadist activities becomes theoretically infinite. The 
closer E is to one, the more the economy can be thought of as operating on its production possibility 
frontier. 
Substituting (2) in (1) and maximizing for the optimum jihadist time allocation, J*, yields 




which shows that more employment opportunities reduce the optimum time allocated to jihadist 
activities. 
The Soufan Group (2015) provides two counts for the number of foreign fighters, an official and an 
unofficial count. Whenever an official and/or unofficial count was available, we used the official count. 
Whenever only an unofficial count was available, we used the unofficial count. This is in line with the 
approach by Benmelech and Klor (2016). The 2015 Soufan Group data is an update of its 2014 report. 
The two reports also mention foreign fighter sending countries for which, at the time of this writing, 
no foreign fighter numbers were available. Our data set includes a total of 81 foreign fighter sending 
countries, for 66 of which the Soufan Group provides numbers. Table 1 lists these countries and their 
foreign fighter numbers by region. The first and second number in parentheses are the total number of 
foreigner fighters and foreign fighters per one million citizens, respectively.  
Unfortunately, data on youth unemployment among the Muslim population is not available for a large 
sample of Western countries. Yet, there is sufficient evidence from case studies that youth 
unemployment is not only highest among Arab countries in general, but that Muslim youth 
unemployment is also regularly above the national average in Western countries.  
According to a report by The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) based on census data from 2001 and 
2011, Muslims have a higher rate of unemployment than the average, despite an increased level of 
education over the ten years. Almost half of the British Muslim population resides in the bottom 10% 
local authority districts for deprivation. Moreover, the report points out to the high proportion of the 
Muslim prison population (13%) and the proportion of Muslims in social housing (28%) as a cause for 
concern (Ridley, 2015). In the period from 2010 to 2015, the number of young people from ethnic 
minority backgrounds, mostly Muslims, who have been unemployed for more than a year has risen by 
almost 50%, according to figures released by the Labour Party (Taylor, 2015).  
In 1999, when the general unemployment rate in France was around 10%, it was more than double at 
22%, among immigrants (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), 2003). 
In 2009, the “Sensitive Urban Zones”, where many immigrants reside, had an unemployment rate of 
around 18.6% compared to a national average of 9.8%; for young people in those neighborhoods, the 
rate reached 43%, contributing to a strong feeling of discrimination (Kepel, 2011). In a study following 
immigrant families over several generations, Maxwell (2009) shows the persistence of high 
unemployment among North Africans in France: up to 28%, with second-generation Muslims more 
affected than their parents (30% compared to 22%; but most of the parents' generation is already 
retired).  
In the Netherlands, ethnic minorities suffer from higher unemployment rates than the average Dutch 
population. In 2009, when the overall rate of unemployment was 5% in the Netherlands, Dutch Muslim 
minority suffered from an 11% unemployment rate. This breaks down to 10% for Turks, and 12% for 
Moroccans. As for the general population, youths are hit especially hard by unemployment, at over 
20% for 15-25 year- olds. Even more problematic, there has been an upward trend in minority youth 




their immigrant parents (FORUM, 2009). The situation is no different in Germany. Most recently, 
Reynolds (2016, p. 36) states that out of the 378 German Muslim foreign fighters in Syria, only 119 
were either in school or employed before departure. 
Consequently, if we accept that, on average, youth unemployment is higher among Muslims, then the 
interaction term of youth unemployment with the Muslim population share becomes a meaningful 
proxy for the lack of assimilation among young Muslims and possibly relevant explanatory variable 
for expat jihadism. The interaction of youth unemployment with the Muslim population share is 
therefore one of our main independent variables. Another independent variable we are interested in is 
the interaction term of youth unemployment with the Muslim majority country dummy, which captures 
the fact that youth unemployment is particularly a big problem in Muslim majority countries. 
Following Benmelech and Klor (2016), we also control for various socioeconomic characteristics. Our 
control variables include those that Benmelech and Klor (2016) use, among others. The control 
variables are: Gross domestic product per capita, human development index, Gini index, distance 
between a country’s capital and Syria’s capital Damascus, the share of manufactures and services as a 
percentage of GDP, the Polity score, an indicator of good governance, ethnic, linguistic and religious 
fractionalization indicators, as well as regional fixed effects. Our hypotheses are summarized in Table 
2. 
We explain the hypothesized signs of the control variables by three arguments. The first argument is 
that negative signs can be explained by variables that capture more economic opportunities and 
therefore higher opportunity costs of joining the Islamic State. In this category fall the variables GDP 
per capita, the Human Development Index, and a country’s internationally competitive productive 
capacity as measured by the manufactures and services export share. The second argument refers to 
variables that suggest that government effectively addresses socioeconomic grievances. The variables 
Polity score and good governance are therefore hypothesized to carry a negative sign. The third idea 
is that there might be structural components in place that undermine equal socioeconomic opportunities 
and which therefore increase citizens’ propensity to leave everything behind. These variables have an 
expected positive sign and are represented by the Gini index and the ethnic, religious and linguistic 
fractionalization indicators. Income inequality is a proxy for the absence of social upward mobility, 
which may drive socioeconomic grievances. This might be especially true when inequality is 
associated with unequal economic opportunities as a result of certain historical events, such as a legacy 
of colonial rule. It also might be the result of perceived or actual, deliberately pursued, political and 
economic acts of discrimination. As for the latter, this will more likely occur in religiously, ethnically, 
and linguistically fractionalized societies where not all societal subgroups are equally represented in 
government. Last but not least, we control for the distance between a country’s capital and Damascus 
and hypothesize that a greater distance from Damascus reduces a country’s number of foreign fighters 
due to greater logistical hurdles. 
Last but not least, we control for regional fixed effects to capture characteristics that go beyond the 
various country specific variables. The regional dummies represent the regional classification of Table 




Europe and Central Asia (EECA), which are the former socialist countries, Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC), South Asia (SA), and Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) against the reference group 
consisting of North America (NAM) and Western Europe (WE). 
Table 3 describes the variables that we use for our empirical analysis, their abbreviation, and sources. 
For those variables whose distributional characteristics could be improved through data manipulations, 
we also indicate the nature of the transformation. Table 4 provides summary statistics for our variables. 
While we use in the regression transformed variables as described in Table 3, the summary statistics 
of Table 4 are based on non-transformed values.  
Because our data is left-censored with countries which have sent zero foreign fighters while the 
observations for those countries that sent foreign fighters are essentially continuous (because it is per 
million citizens), we had to choose between a Tobit and a Heckit model. Heckit is often deemed 
superior to Tobit if there are different underlying variables for explaining non-zero observations and 
the magnitude of the non-zero observations. This is not the case here. Youth unemployment can be 
assumed to explain both the decision to become an expat jihadist and the magnitude of a country’s 
expat jihadism. We therefore employ a simple Tobit (Tobit 1) model. We run our regression using the 
open source statistical analysis software “gretl,” whose accompanying manual also provides a technical 
description of the Tobit estimator. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
In order to be prepared for eventual multicollinearity problems, we first present in Table 5 a Pearson 
correlation matrix for our right-hand-side variables (using the transformed variables as described in 
Table 3). As the correlation matrix shows, our key variables “MusXyuer” and “MusMajXyuer” (the 
interaction terms of Muslim population and Muslim majority dummy with the youth unemployment 
rate) are not strongly correlated with any of the other explanatory variables (which are not part of the 
interaction term), except for the variable “Dist” We therefore do not expect non-significance or 
unexpected signs for the “MusXyuer” or “MusMajXyuer” variable due to multicollinearity except 
when run together with “Dist” We also expect that running the variables “lny,” “HDI”, and “GovX” 
together on the right hand side may lead to unexpected non- significance or flipping signs.  
Table 6 shows the Tobit regression results for various specifications. The results indicate that the two 
interaction terms “MusXyuer” and “MusMajXyuer” are highly significant when run individually (not 
shown) and when run together with their individual components (Model I). Models II-IV add the two 
variables “lny” and “HDI” first individually and then jointly on the right hand side of model 
specification one. The two interaction terms “MusXyuer” and “MusMajXyuer” are still highly 
significant with the expected signs. Our results confirm the non-intuitive finding already presented by 
Benmelech and Klor (2016) that countries with higher GDP per capita incomes and greater human 
development have, ceteris paribus, more foreign fighters joining the Islamic State (Models II and III).  
In Model IV, which compared to Model I includes both “lny” and “HDI” on the right hand side, the 
sign of “lny” is now flipped and negatively significant compared to Model II. In the subsequent Models 




variable “MSExpShr” to the specification of Model III and we obtain an unexpected positive, but 
statistically non-significant, coefficient. Model VI adds the two variables “Polity” and “GovX” to 
Model V, for which we obtain the expected negative signs, but the coefficients are not significant. 
Model VII is concerned with the addition of the socio-structural parameters “Gini” and the various 
fractionalization indicators. Here, the Gini coefficient receives a statistically significant negative sign, 
which is another finding that is in line with Benmelech and Klor (2016). Last but not least, Model VIII 
adds to Model VII the variable “Dist” and regional fixed effects. In this specification, the variable 
“Gini” keeps the unexpected negative sign, but is no longer significant. The regional fixed effect for 
Sub Saharan Africa is negative and statistically significantly (relative to the high income regions 
Western Europe and North America as the reference regions not included in the regression). The 
variable “Dist” is also not significant. 
While the regressions provide many puzzling results, especially the non-expected signs for “lny”, 
“HDI” and “Gini”, our theoretical key variables “MusXyuer” and “MusMajXyuer” are highly robust 
and carry the expected sign across all specifications. We therefore do not arrive at the same conclusion 
as Benmelech and Klor (2016) who find that the unemployment problem behind expat jihadism is 
driven by Arab countries exclusively. Instead, based on our regression results, we would argue that 
youth unemployment among the Muslim population is an explanatory factor of expat jihadism 
worldwide.  
While we find that focusing on youth unemployment is a more appropriate indicator to understand the 
phenomenon of expat jihadism, it is clearly the interaction of youth unemployment and Muslim 
population shares that drive our results. We then wanted to see whether an interaction term of the 
regular unemployment rate with the Muslim population share, as well as with a Muslim majority 
dummy would generate different results and found (not reported here) that we essentially get the same 
story. This means that if Benmelech and Klor (2016) had used interaction terms as well, they would 
have received highly significant results as well.  
It is important to state again that our interaction term of the Muslim population share and youth 
unemployment does not measure youth unemployment among the Muslim population per se, but is a 
proxy for economic grievance among Muslims. Yet again, there is strong case study evidence that 
youth unemployment rates among Muslims are above aggregate youth unemployment levels in 
Western countries. Youth unemployment is also a distinct problem in Arab countries. 
5. Conclusions 
The discussion about the push factors behind the flow of foreign fighters into Syria is unresolved and 
filled with riddles. One particular issue of controversy is the role of economic grievance, especially 
the role of unemployment. Some scholars find support for the hypothesis that unemployment is a driver 
of expat jihadism, others reject this idea. Different studies, of course, use different samples and 
different methodologies and it will still take some time until a predominant opinion is solidified with 




According to our empirical model, both youth unemployment in Muslim countries and youth 
unemployment among Muslims in Western countries are a strong predictor of expat jihadism. Youth 
unemployment among Muslims therefore serves as an early warning indicator which should receive 
particular policy attention, regardless of the region of the world. 
As Muslim youth unemployment, at least in our study, is a universal driver of expat jihadism, the 
policy implications are very different for Muslim states and Western countries where Muslims are a 
minority. Muslim states face the problem of providing access to economic opportunities to everyone, 
Western countries with a minority Muslim population face a problem of successful integration and 
assimilation. 
As far as the Western states are concerned, the problems are indeed far beyond pure economics. Is 
Muslim youth unemployment the result of Muslim immigrants’ inability to assimilate in a culturally 
different society, or is it because Western states fail to develop successful integration strategies? 
Whatever it is, our paper strongly indicates that jobs to young Muslims is to expat jihadism what is 
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Table 1: Foreign Fighter Sending Countries in Syria and Iraq by Region 
East Asia and the Pacific 
(EAP) 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(EECA) 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) 
Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) 
Australia (120, 5.2) Albania (90, 31.1) Argentina (23, 0.5) Algeria (170, 4.5) 
Cambodia (1, 0.1) Armenia (n/a, n/a) Brazil (3, 0) Bahrain (n/a, n/a) 
China (300, 0.2) Azerbaijan (104, 11) Chile (n/a, n/a) Egypt, Arab Rep. (600, 6.8) 
Indonesia (700, 2.8) Bosnia and Herzeg. (330, 86.3) Trinidad and Tobago (50, 37.1) Iran, Islamic Rep. (n/a, n/a) 
Japan (9, 0.1) Bulgaria (n/a, n/a)  Iraq (n/a, n/a) 
Malaysia (100, 3.4) Czech Republic (n/a, n/a)  Israel (45, 5.6) 
N. Zealand (7.5, 1.7) Estonia (n/a, n/a)  Jordan (2000, 277.9) 
Philippines (100, 1) Georgia (50, 13.2)  Kuwait (70, 19.6) 
Singapore (2, 0.4) Hungary (n/a, n/a)  Lebanon (900, 171.3) 
 Kazakhstan (300, 17.6)  Libya (600, 95.6) 
 Kosovo (232, 128.5)  Morocco (1200, 35.9) 
 Kyrgyz Republic (500, 87.3)  Qatar (10, 4.8) 
 Macedonia, FYR (146, 70.5)  Saudi Arabia (2500, 82.8) 
 Moldova (1, 0.3)  Tunisia (6000, 551) 
 Montenegro (30, 48.3)  United Arab Em. (15, 1.7) 
 Romania (1, 0.1)   
 Russia  (2400, 16.7)   
 Serbia (60, 8.4)   
 Tajikistan (386, 47.6)   
 Turkmenistan (360, 68.7)   
 Uzbekistan (500, 16.5)   
North America (NAM) South Asia (SA) Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) Western Europe (WE) 
Canada (130, 3.7) Afghanistan (50, 1.6) Chad (n/a, n/a) Austria (300, 35.3) 
USA (150, 0.5) Bangladesh (n/a, n/a) Cote d'Ivoire (n/a, n/a) Belgium (470, 42.1) 
 India (23, 0) Eritrea (n/a, n/a) Denmark (125, 22.2) 
 Maldives (200, 508.9) Madagascar (3, 0.1) Finland (70, 12.9) 
 Pakistan (70, 0.4) Mauritania (n/a, n/a) France (1700, 25.7) 
  Somalia (70, 6.8) Germany (760, 9.3) 
  South Africa (1, 0) Ireland (30, 6.5) 
  Sudan (70, 1.8) Italy (87, 1.4) 
   Luxembourg (n/a, n/a) 
   Netherlands (220, 13.1) 
   Norway (81, 16) 
   Portugal (12, 1.1) 
   Spain (133, 2.9) 
   Sweden (300, 31.2) 
   Switzerland (57, 7) 
   Turkey (2100, 27.6) 
   UK (760, 11.8) 












Table 2: Hypothesis Table (Dependent Variable = Foreign Fighters per one Million Citizens) 
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Table 3: Description of Data 
Variable Name Abbreviation Transformation Source 
Foreign Fighters (per Million) FFperMill ln(FF/Pop×1,000,000+1) 
The Soufan Group, An Updated Assessment of the 
Flow of Foreign Fighters, December 2015.  
Youth unemployment rate 
(Unemployment, youth total 
(% of total labor force ages 15-
24), modeled ILO estimate) 
yuer ln(yuer) 
World Bank Development Indicators, Average 
2011-2014 
Muslim population (% total) Muslim n/a 
Association of Religion Data Archives (online), 
World Religion Dataset: National Religion Dataset, 
2010 Observations 
Interaction term of Muslim 
population and youth 
unemployment rate 
MusXyuer ln(muslim*yuer+1) 
Association of Religion Data Archives (online) and 
World Bank Development Indicator Database. 
Interaction term of youth 
unemployment rate and 
Muslim Majority Country 
Dummy (Muslim > 50%) 
Dummy 
MusMajXyuer n/a 
Calculated from Association of Religion Data 
Archives and World Bank Development Indicator 
Database 
GDP per capita ($2005) y ln(y) World Bank Development Indicator Database 
Human Development Index HDI n/a 
United Nations Development Programme – Human 
Development Report, http://hdr.undp.org/en/data 
(accessed: March 8, 2017) 
Distance of country’s capital to 
Damascus (in km) 
Dist ln(Dist)  
Mayer, Thierry, and Soledad Zignago. "Notes on 
CEPII’s distances measures: The GeoDist database" 
(2011) – dist_cepii.dta dataset 
Gini Index Gini n/a 
World Bank Development Indicator Database, 
Latest available observation. 
Manufacturing and services 
export (% GDP) 
MSExpShr ln(MSExpShr+1) 
Calculated from World Bank Development 
Indicator Database using the variables Merchandise 
exports by the reporting economy (current US$), 
Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports), 
Service exports (BoP, current US$), and GDP 
(current US$). 2010 Values 
Polity Score Polity n/a 
Center for Systemic Peace, Polity 2 Indicator, 2010 
observation 
Good Governance GovX 
Simple arithmetic mean 
of the indicators Voice 
and Accountability, 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence, 
Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law, and 
Control of Corruption. 
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
2010 Observations 
Population Pop n/a 
World Bank Development Indicator Database, 
2011-2015 average. 
Ethnic Fractionalization Ethnic n/a 
Alesina et al. (2003) Linguistic Fractionalization Lang n/a 












Table 4: Summary Statistics of Variables 
 Sample Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. IQ range 
FFperMill 
All 13.63 0.00 0.00 551.04 59.26 1.49 
FFCtry=1 41.70 8.86 0.01 551.04 98.34 33.88 
FFCtry=0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MusXyuer 
All 498.47 58.78 0.00 4,520.20 871.00 586.01 
FFCtry=1 816.22 183.99 0.18 4,520.20 1,072.60 1,593.50 
FFCtry=0 225.61 17.34 0.00 2,977.90 517.84 173.32 
MusMajXyuer 
All 4.31 0.00 0.00 46.60 9.24 0.00 
FFCtry=1 7.85 0.00 0.00 46.60 11.80 15.75 
FFCtry=0 1.63 0.00 0.00 32.48 5.35 0.00 
Muslim 
All 25.00 4.06 0.00 99.56 35.91 43.59 
FFCtry=1 37.93 12.89 0.01 99.56 40.25 86.77 
FFCtry=0 15.28 1.00 0.00 99.00 28.82 14.77 
MusMaj 
All 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.43 0.00 
FFCtry=1 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 1.00 
FFCtry=0 0.13 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.34 0.00 
yuer 
All 18.37 15.25 0.70 58.43 12.29 16.05 
FFCtry=1 20.95 18.50 0.70 58.43 13.08 17.13 
FFCtry=0 16.18 11.53 0.70 52.68 11.18 14.61 
y 
All 14,851 5,021 214 145,220 22,822 17,335 
FFCtry=1 19,879 8,916 414 103,270 22,922 34,132 
FFCtry=0 11,470 3,547 214 145,220 22,215 10,783 
HDI 
All 0.68 0.71 0.33 0.94 0.16 0.26 
FFCtry=1 0.75 0.77 0.37 0.94 0.14 0.21 
FFCtry=0 0.63 0.64 0.33 0.90 0.15 0.26 
Gini 
All 39.45 38.81 24.09 63.38 8.55 12.89 
FFCtry=1 35.37 33.83 25.90 63.38 7.12 9.98 
FFCtry=0 42.41 42.75 24.09 60.97 8.30 11.80 
MSExpShr 
All 27.56 20.35 0.00 169.73 28.96 28.75 
FFCtry=1 29.87 21.01 0.00 151.49 29.58 25.95 
FFCtry=0 25.62 16.39 0.22 169.73 28.45 27.42 
Polity 
All 3.80 6.00 -10.00 10.00 6.23 10.75 
FFCtry=1 3.89 7.50 -10.00 10.00 6.69 12.00 
FFCtry=0 3.71 6.00 -10.00 10.00 5.80 9.00 
GovX 
All -0.02 -0.18 -2.33 1.87 0.91 1.42 
FFCtry=1 0.09 -0.08 -2.33 1.87 1.05 1.87 
FFCtry=0 -0.09 -0.25 -1.74 1.65 0.80 1.32 
Ethnic 
All 0.44 0.43 0.00 0.93 0.26 0.48 
FFCtry=1 0.41 0.40 0.01 0.88 0.25 0.46 
FFCtry=0 0.46 0.47 0.00 0.93 0.26 0.48 
Lang 
All 0.39 0.36 0.00 0.92 0.28 0.51 
FFCtry=1 0.35 0.33 0.01 0.87 0.26 0.43 
FFCtry=0 0.42 0.38 0.00 0.92 0.29 0.54 
Relig 
All 0.44 0.46 0.00 0.86 0.23 0.40 
FFCtry=1 0.41 0.43 0.00 0.86 0.24 0.41 
FFCtry=0 0.46 0.49 0.00 0.82 0.22 0.39 
Dist 
All 6,284 5,180 86 18,162 4,183 6,932 
FFCtry=1 4,092 3,062 86 16,286 3,399 3,359 





Table 5: Pearson Correlation Matrix of Right-Hand Side Variables 
  Muslim MusMaj Dist Gini Polity GovX Ethnic Lang Relig HDI MSExpShr MusXyuer MusMajXyuer ln(y) 
Muslim 1                           
MusMaj 0.95 1                         
Dist -0.44 -0.37 1                       
Gini -0.14 -0.16 0.46 1                     
Polity -0.46 -0.4 0.22 -0.12 1                   
GovX -0.4 -0.37 0.09 -0.29 0.56 1                 
Ethnic 0.26 0.19 -0.12 0.26 -0.24 -0.42 1               
Lang 0.17 0.11 -0.12 0.15 -0.15 -0.3 0.7 1             
Relig -0.33 -0.31 0.2 0.19 0.1 0.1 0.15 0.26 1           
HDI -0.27 -0.23 -0.02 -0.37 0.31 0.77 -0.5 -0.54 -0.07 1         
MSExpShr -0.27 -0.22 -0.06 -0.3 0.34 0.52 -0.42 -0.2 0.07 0.49 1       
MusXyuer 0.79 0.69 -0.62 -0.17 -0.34 -0.25 0.3 0.27 -0.13 -0.17 -0.19 1     
MusMajXyuer 0.94 0.97 -0.38 -0.16 -0.42 -0.35 0.13 0.03 -0.32 -0.17 -0.23 0.7 1   













Table 6: Tobit Regression Results (DV: lnFFperMill) 


































































































































































































       
-2.489** 
(1.039) 
n 149 146 146 145 123 116 100 100 
left-censored 85 83 84 83 68 62 56 56 
Log-likelihood -188.343 -161.618 -152.634 -147.534 -129.262 -122.812 -90.436 -86.1 
Standard errors in parentheses, ***=significant at 1%, **=significant at 5%,*=significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
 
